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Nationalism and Ethnic Identity in the
Sino-Korean Border Region of Yanbian,
1945–1950
Adam Cathcart
This article chronicles the evolution of ethnic politics in the Yanbian region, focus-
ing on the Chinese Korean communist leader Chu To˘k-hae during the Chinese
civil war and the early Korean War. Chu’s advocacy of Chinese nationality for ethnic
Koreans is juxtaposed with his cooperation with North Korea, conflict over North
Korean refugees, and examinations of the Yanbian region’s role between the
People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The
‘‘Resist America and Aid Korea’’ movement provides the most dramatic example
of how Chu and ethnic Koreans in Yanbian expressed a uniquely tinged Chinese
nationalism while continuing to lend support to North Korea. The article thereby
aims to contribute to the regional history of Northeast Asia, add texture to debates
on Chinese and Korean nationalism in that region, and reveal new aspects of
Chinese Korean agency in the earliest years of Chinese Communist Party control.
In the immense outpouring of scholarship that examines the Korean
experience from 1945 to 1950, the role of Chinese Koreans, or Choso˘njok,
in Yanbian during those years has received relatively little attention. The
years 1945–1950 were not simply critical for the Korean minority in
a China establishing a new and pro-communist framework, they also
witnessed a burgeoning of cultural and political ties between Yanbian
and the emerging North Korean republic.1 Yet in those years, Koreans
in Manchuria were not only saddled with past participation in the failed
experiment of Manchukuo and rejected as collaborators by the Chinese
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Nationalist Party (Guomindang), they were often unable to return to
ancestral locales on the Korean peninsula. In this situation, Chinese
Koreans by necessity looked to unity with the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) as the Party clambered into the Northeast. Not until the outbreak
of the Korean War in 1950, however, was the ‘‘Korean minority’’ in
China in a position to fully prove its loyalty to the new Chinese state.
Examination of Chinese Koreans in the period just following the Japanese
surrender indicates new aspects of identity politics and ethnic nationalism
and reveals the unique role played by Chinese Koreans as local agents of
contact with North Korea along a highly significant wartime frontier.
What influence did Chinese Koreans have on the North Korean revolu-
tion and the North Korean war effort? What aspects of connectivity
between China and the North Korean nascent regime emanated from
Yanbian? To answer these questions is to shed new light on the dynamics
among Koreans of various citizenship in the period just after 1945.
One of the most important Chinese Koreans in this period was
the Chinese Communist Party administrator Chu To˘k-hae (Zhu Dehai
朱德海). Chu played a crucial role in consolidating communist power
and promoting a Korean-tinged nationalism in Yanbian. He engaged in
multiple areas of cooperation with neighboring North Korea; his merits as
an internationalist for China and as an advocate for Chinese Koreans have
gone unnoticed in most of the English-language literature.2 After a brief
examination of North Korean immigrants who saw Yanbian as an illegal
gateway to opportunity in China, the essay concludes with an exposition
of Chinese Korean participation in the early war effort for the ‘‘War
to Resist America and Aid Korea.’’ The article’s geographical focus is
Yo˘nbyo˘n (Yanbian), the large cluster of counties on the eastern edge
of Jilin province. Today, this area is particularly consequential as the
site of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region (Yanbian Chaoxianzu
Zizhizhou), a locus of cooperation with North Korea and the home of
about half of the entire Korean population in the People’s Republic
of China (PRC).
What happened in the Sino-Korean borderland from 1945 to 1950,
and the role played by China’s Korean minority in those events, remains
largely an untold story. To be sure, scholars have deftly intertwined the
Chinese civil war and the Korean War through research on the military/
operational impact of some fifty thousand Koreans who returned to join
the Korean People’s Army in 1950.3 However, the overall role of the
Yanbian region or the view of Chinese Koreans as regional players in their
own right has been lacking. Foundational monographs on the Chinese
civil war eschew local treatments of the Korean frontier and do not
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venture into in-depth studies of Yanbian.4 Studies of the Korean minority
tend to be constructed in much broader temporal terms, often covering
a century or two, and pass over the war years in fleeting fashion.5 More
recent critical studies of Koreans in Manchuria are immensely informa-
tive, yet remain confined to colonial experiences.6 Work by the prolific
Chae-Jin Lee serves as a vital cornerstone for the present research, but
even Lee’s work skirts Chu To˘k-hae and the new documents, analyzed
here for the first time, from the PRC Foreign Ministry Archives in
Beijing.7 Scholars working in Chinese, particularly those based at Yanbian
University, naturally have focused on the issue of Chinese nationality for
the Korean minority most extensively. Their access to historical sources,
and bilingual command of those sources, is unparalleled by any Western
scholar, but their works remain hamstrung by Chinese Communist Party
orthodoxies, meaning that narratives of anti-Japanese resistance and flawless
ethnic cooperation tend to dominate.8 While Charles Armstrong’s mono-
graph mentions Yanbian at multiple points and highlights events in North
Hamgyo˘ng province, at no point in discussing the milieu after 1945 does
his work pierce the northern frontier or analyze events in Yanbian as they
inflected the North Korean revolution in more than a passing way.9
Of the works dealing with ethnic Koreans from 1945 to 1950, official
CCP biographies of major local cadre such as Chu To˘k-hae, if somewhat
hagiographical, add much to the known narrative of Yanbian and the
Korean population in the Northeast.10 The Yanbian archive remains
closed to foreigners for the time being, but published digests of the
archive’s holdings, especially those issued in the liberal 1980s, provide
an excellent point of departure.11 As a forerunner for relatively open
access, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive of the PRC in Beijing
contains hundreds of detailed documents dealing with Northeast China
and the Sino-Korean relationship from 1949 to 1958.12 These documents
are inclusive of the problem of allegiance and nationality among ethnic
Koreans in the Northeast and deal also with the issue of prewar and
wartime refugees from North Korea into the Chinese borderlands. Used
in combination with local histories and newspapers, the Foreign Ministry
Archive aids in revising and augmenting the necessary historical ground-
work for future examinations of the Korean minority in China, and
Yanbian in particular, during the Korean War. It is a final aim of the
article to further establish the role of lesser-known individuals, from pro-
vincial cadre to illegal immigrants, to illustrate the many linkages between
Yanbian and North Korea, illustrating previously unknown aspects of
North Korean relations with China in the era of state construction and
mobilization for national defense.13
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Colonial Legacies: Continuities and Destruction
The issue of national identity of ethnic Koreans in the regions north of
the Tumen River is, like most things involving Manchuria, in dispute.
Koreans settled in the region as early as the Han dynasty, and with the
recession of Chinese power south of the Great Wall in the third century
A.D., Koguryo˘ rule flourished in the region. Even when the Chinese
armies of Sui Yangdi and subsequently the Tang swept toward the Korean
peninsula, they never approached the Tumen River, leaving Yanbian as an
area of indeterminate status in the aftermath of Korea’s unification wars
in the seventh century. With the arrival of successive conquest dynasties
of Liao, Jin, and Yuan, the clusters of Koreans in Manchuria were sub-
ordinated to the ruling northern dynasties. The later years of the Choso˘n
dynasty (1392–1910) brought bilateral negotiations with the Qing and
the relatively definitive establishment of the Tumen River as a Sino-
Korean border.14 As the Qing lurched toward the realization that
Manchuria was vulnerable in the 1880s, crop yields plunged in neighbor-
ing North Hamgyo˘ng province, and Korean migration to Manchuria
accelerated. With the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 and the
extension of the nominal Chinese Republic to the Northeast in 1912,
issues of nationality, nationalism, and law began to lash themselves to
the Koreans with new vigor and tendentiousness. Migration to Manchuria
accelerated rapidly in this period. Koreans came to Yanbian/Kando for
many reasons: some came to escape bad debts, others to flee Japanese
police, and many more came for the cheap land offered by both Japanese
and Chinese companies.15 The creation of Manchukuo in 1932, paradox-
ically, finally offered the possibility of citizenship to these Koreans in
Manchuria. Only a handful came to make revolution, but Japanese
repression created more than a few revolutionaries.
By 1932, more than one million Koreans were resident in Manchuria,
and virtually all were Japanese subjects. Their association with Japan,
enhanced by the establishment of Japanese consulates in areas they tended
to inhabit, thereby made the Koreans the target of Chinese nationalistic
excesses. The Nanking government and its ruling Nationalist Party/
Guomindang did little to mitigate local outbreaks of anti-Korean senti-
ment. Chinese often perceived Korean complicity in the creation and
sustenance of Japan’s Manchukuo, where the Koreans were among the
‘‘Five Great Ethnic Groups,’’ added to the Chinese stereotype of Koreans
as opportunists (or, in the case of Kim Il Sung, bandits). The anti-Korean
trend of the early 1930s was reinforced by the CCP, whose rhetorical
accord with Lenin’s theories of harmony with the nationalities fell victim
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to Stalinist paranoia. Thousands of Korean communists were killed or
exposed to the Japanese police in the bloody months of the ‘‘Minsaengdan
Incident,’’ an inner-Party purge centered in Yanbian that eviscerated
the CCP in areas where nearly 90 percent of cadre had been ethnic
Koreans.16 This breach in the Chinese-Korean leftist front would leave
deep and lasting scars in the Yanbian area.
As the Pacific War progressed, Korean conscription by Japan in-
creased and collaborationist Koreans were sent to, and recruited from
within, Manchuria to hunt down bandits. Some Korean members of the
CCP in Yanbian were arrested and subsequently urged into the ranks
of the very Japanese security forces they had once attacked, with tragic
results. Close governmental cooperation between Manchukuo and the
Korean administration in Seoul (all occurring under the auspices of a
Greater East Asia Ministry in Tokyo) accelerated such assimilation, and
Japanese companies like the South Manchurian Railway actively moved
Korean migrants in and out of Manchuria and Yanbian. Koreans farmed
in defensible rural communities, where they remained as Japanese subjects
until Red Army parachutes blossomed out of the sky, signaling the
destruction of Manchukuo, in 1945.
Liberation
The arrival of Soviet troops in militarily vulnerable Hunchun, the eastern-
most of Yanbian’s counties, in August 1945 augured great changes for
Koreans across the region. The subsequent Soviet interlude in Yanbian
was brief but consequential. Problems with Soviet looting and rape of
Japanese, as in other areas of Northeast China and Korea, were unsettling,
but the Soviets primarily left the Koreans to their own affairs and encour-
aged peasant attacks on landlords. (Little machinery existed in the region
for the Red Army to loot, in contrast to the industrially rich urban hubs
in Liaoning province.) From their arrival in Yanbian in late August 1945,
the Soviets inspired an ambivalent response from the ethnic Koreans,
as seen in Yanji, where about one thousand people turned out for an
all-city ‘‘rally of thanks’’ on August 22. Interestingly, the authors of
Red Army documents in Yanbian drew clear distinctions between ethnic
Koreans (to whom they referred simply as ‘‘Koreans’’) and Han (‘‘Chinese’’).
At the rally, an unnamed Korean school teacher gave a speech whose tact
paid little heed to any conception of a Chinese nation-state. ‘‘The reason
that the Soviet Red Army comes here,’’ he noted, ‘‘is not to occupy our
land, but to liberate Manchuria (Manzhouli ) and the Korean people.’’17
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To whom the liberated land would be handed over, however, was not
indicated.
Destroying pillars of Japanese rule in small cities and Korean-majority
areas of the countryside was a crucial aspect of CCP legitimacy in the
struggle for eastern Manchuria, and one the Party tried but failed to totally
achieve before the spring planting of 1946. Hundreds if not thousands
of collaborationist Koreans were caught up in the ‘‘oppose traitors to the
Han, clear the accounts’’ movements that swept across Eastern Jilin in
spring 1946. For the biggest offenders (most often landlords or infamous
members of security forces), judgments were rendered at mass meetings,
often followed by a quick execution. Under these conditions, allegiances
among ethnic Koreans changed rapidly. In Antu, the interior gateway
along the Chinese Eastern Railway into Yanbian, a local power broker
named Bi Shuwen is a good case in point. Bi had been known for
collaborating with Japanese, but after his Kwantung Army sponsors
capitulated, he went over to the CCP. Using his new position, he then
proceeded to surrender the city of Antu and its crucial railroad to the
incoming Nationalists, yet again maintaining his power as a local official.
In March 1946, however, he fled the city and went into hiding when the
CCP returned; he managed to survive the worst years of the civil war, but
was ultimately captured and tried in 1949.
Events in Antu were replicated in other areas of eastern Jilin province.
In the industrial center Tonghua, big public trials were held for Korean
collaborators with the Japanese on April 21, 1946. And at Longjing (a
bustling county outside of Yanji), the CCP pushed public trials of the
‘‘traitors’’ at the end of April 1946.18 Well after the CCP had established
control of the region, judicial proceedings against collaborators continued
to crop up periodically. While he was in Moscow in January 1950, new
PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (周恩来) was confronted with the need
to dispense advice to cadre in the Yanbian region as to how to deal with
trials of Korean collaborators in the region.19 The communist revolutions
in North Korea and Manchuria occurred with some rapidity, but in
dealing with collaborators and national identity, they were hardly imme-
diately complete.
The rush of the Japanese to disembark left multiple properties and
assets in limbo, resulting in factional and self-interested behavior by Koreans
and Han Chinese, who alike were fighting over the Japanese leavings.20
Attacks on Japanese settlers, Chinese landlords, and pro-Japanese Koreans
were rapid indeed in 1945. Killing landlords and participating in public
struggle meetings was, as in other parts of China, an important means
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not just of overthrowing the old order, but in asserting an anti-Japanese,
anti-Manchukuo identity in Yanbian.
The exodus of most of the Japanese army, along with vociferous
attacks on local collaborationist landlords, led to the proliferation of
bandit groups in the hills and mountains of the Yanbian region. Yanbian,
and eastern Manchuria more broadly, was rife with various independent
patriotic Korean militia whose return to Korea was prevented by appre-
hensive Soviet border guards. Some of these groups took to serious clashes
with Japanese remnants. The most notable battle occurred in southern
Jilin province on February 3, 1946, near the city of Tonghua, where
newly formed independent ethnic Korean armies numbering in the
thousands fought with remnant Japanese soldiers. The scale of the battle,
along with parallel violence springing up in nearby Yanbian counties,
indicates that the settling of colonial-era disputes over loyalties and issues
of identity would not be regarded as immediate.21
While violence involving Koreans within Manchuria was con-
spicuous, migration to the Korean peninsula was less prevalent. Of the
1.4 million Koreans who had inhabited the Northeast in August 1945,
fewer than one third returned to Korea.22 Migration to Korea was not
encouraged by the Soviets, and news of Soviet atrocities north of the
38th parallel, along with rumors of chaotic American rule in South Korea,
dampened enthusiasm for Korea as a magnet for return immigration. But
reasons existed to move. In early September 1945, Soviet soldiers killed
nine Koreans near an elementary school in an incident in Yanbian,
stimulating a brief but intense opposition.23 Stories of a Soviet suppres-
sion of a student revolt in the border city of Sinu˘iju, however, indicated
that North Korea was hardly a better destination: on November 25, 1945,
the Red Army had killed dozens and arrested more than seven hundred
Koreans in putting down a student-led insurrection just across the
river from China.24 Lacking the advocacy of a powerful unified Korean
government, the vast majority of Koreans in Manchuria elected to remain
stationary.
The arrival of the Guomindang in Yanbian in spring 1946 repre-
sented a new pressure whose impact for Koreans was characterized by
almost unanimous negativity. Although the Koreans felt they had achieved
a heightened status by having fought the Japanese as part of the liberation
campaign in 1945, the Nationalists turned against the Koreans, label-
ing them as collaborators.25 Although the Guomindang had cooperated
with Koreans in Chongqing during the war and had supported Korean
independence, such concerns did not mitigate the counterproductive
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fashion in which the Guomindang approached the ethnic Koreans in the
Northeast.26 Han-Korean tensions were intense, and the Guomindang
did little but enflame such passions in the areas under their control.
Some Han called the Koreans ‘‘secondary devils’’ (er guizi 二鬼子), a
goading reference to their perceived closeness to, and inferiority to, the
‘‘Japanese devils’’ (Riben guizi 日本鬼子). The anti-Korean violence by
Han Chinese did not reach Yanbian with great force, owing to the
numerical superiority of ethnic Koreans, but refugees from the heart of
Jilin province arrived in Yanji laden with stories of violence by angry
Han. An investigative delegation dispatched by the Korean Provisional
Government based in Shanghai estimated that 75 Koreans had been killed
and 237 injured in Changchun in 1946. By tolerating this violence and
treating all Koreans as aliens within China, even forcing several thousand
Koreans in Liaoning province into concentration camps for repatriation,
the Guomindang lost its chance of gaining the support of the ethnic
Koreans.27 Other Koreans were concentrating in Harbin for safety, coin-
ciding with the CCP’s urban goals, and moving toward the relative calm
of Yanbian.28 When the Guomindang made clear in 1946 that it viewed
all Koreans in Manchuria as aliens who should, eventually, be deported,
even though the policy was later rescinded, the action left little room for
pro-Nanking sentiment among Koreans.
The CCP moved to regain the sympathies of ethnic Koreans in
Yanbian by tolerating and promoting the renaissance of Korean language
and culture and by pushing the standard platform of social reforms
appealing to peasants. Some 90 percent of Koreans in Yanbian were
farmers to whom the CCP policy of land redistribution clearly appealed,
particularly when juxtaposed against the confiscatory bent of the return-
ing Guomindang. Korean Workers’ Party propaganda from across the
border was another general means of reinforcing the perceived effective-
ness of communist governance.29 With the withdrawal of Soviet soldiers
out of Yanbian and into North Korea in spring 1946, the Guomindang
struggled briefly for control in the region. The Guomindang lasted
longest in Hunchun but finally submitted to CCP power in 1947, and
Yanbian thereafter became a solidly communist area. However, the extent
to which it was a solidly Chinese area was still in question. The process
of joining the Chinese nation would be a particularly difficult one for
ethnic Koreans in Northeast China.30
The establishment of CCP administration in Yanbian required the
participation of a new type of postwar leader: the Chinese Communist
ethnic Korean. The men of this pattern who emerged were committed
internationalists who consistently promoted intercourse with North Korea,
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but they used their ties with North Korea to enmesh themselves further in
the Chinese project of nation-building. These local leaders in Yanbian
would solicit support from North Korea prior to 1950, and they would
also serve a vital role for the central government in Beijing in rendering
aid to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the
Korean War. It is to the most significant of those local leaders, Chu
To˘k-hae, that we now turn.
Chu To˘k-hae and the Construction of Chinese Korean
Identity in Yanbian
The year 1948 was a triumphant one for Korean communists. The Soviet
occupation of North Korea was coming to an end, and an independent
nation, the Democractic People’s Republic of Korea, would emerge in
September. More than fifty thousand Korean troops fighting on the
battlefield of the Chinese civil war in Manchuria were turning the tide.
The year witnessed successive losses by Guomindang armies in the Liao-
Shen battles in Manchuria, making irrevocably clear that, short of full-
scale U.S. intervention, that region would finally become an unassailable
communist base. The creation of a Chinese communist republic—as
distinct from the nation-less guerilla bases or ‘‘liberated areas’’ from
which Mao Zedong and other communists had plied their ideology
in Manchuria—would become a reality. Within this victorious and un-
precedented context, an ethnic Korean, Chu To˘k-hae, was selected by
the CCP hierarchy to become the first regional secretary of Yanbian.
Chu was an ideal candidate for the job. Born in the Russian Far East
in 1911, he had moved to Helong (a small city near Yanji) in 1920 and
came of age with the revolution, joining the Communist Youth League in
1930 and the Party the next year. After participation in the Northeast
United Anti-Japanese Army, he went to Moscow for three years and
finally spent 1939–1945 in the northwest base of Yan’an, where he forged
relationships with the top CCP leaders. In autumn 1945, Chu had raced
headlong to Manchuria with about twenty thousand other cadre, led by
CCP Central Committee member Chen Yun (陈云), to stake the Party’s
claim to the region. Chu’s mission was to oversee work with the ethnic
Koreans, a population whose anger at the spurning Guomindang did not
necessarily equate with unequivocal embrace of the CCP.31 Chu To˘k-hae
had arrived in Yanji with nineteen cadre on November 11, 1945, and, a
week later, joined Chen Yun in Harbin, where he intended to organize
gathering numbers of Koreans into militia forces.32 In Harbin, Chu
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engaged in what must have been a manic twenty-four hours of activity, as
he was almost immediately asked by the Soviet occupation forces to leave
the city. The Soviets were not interested in facilitating the establishment,
let alone the arming or the training, of Korean groups not directly under
Soviet control. Chu, however, departed Harbin with about six hundred
Korean militiamen who would form the kernel of CCP forces in the Yan-
bian region. From November 1945 to August 1948, Chu moved among
the cities and hamlets of eastern Jilin, engaging in ‘‘anti-bandit’’ activities
against holdout Guomindang forces and recalcitrant landlords. He also
moved to shore up support for the revolution among the vast majority
of rural Koreans, agitating within the Party for attention to Korean issues.
One significant means of guiding Koreans to the CCP was via propaganda
and the arts, areas in which Chu had particular interest and many close
friends.33 Artistic activities among Koreans were a potent and prevalent
means of justifying the seizure of political power from departing Japanese
as well as the incoming Guomindang.
As the civil war in Manchuria neared its conclusion in the frigid
spring of 1948, the CCP sought to refine and justify its stance toward
the Korean minority from the standpoint of theory. For this purpose,
the Party convened meetings in Jilin city in February 1948. Chu To˘k-hae
participated actively, justifying the inclusion of Koreans as a minority
(shaoshuminzu 少数民族) deserving of Chinese nationality, continually
returning in his remarks to the role of Koreans in the anti-Japanese
guerrilla resistance in Manchuria as justification. (Chu wisely failed to
mention that this resistance also served as the taproot of the North
Korean revolution.) Seemingly ignoring his history lessons, those con-
vened in Jilin floated several theories under which the issue of the
nationality of Koreans in China could be resolved. The idea of a ‘‘Theory
of Multi-Nationality’’ for Koreans was advanced, but Chu found it
unacceptable. His attitude was likewise hostile toward the ‘‘Three-
Nationality Theory,’’ an idea that held that Koreans in Manchuria had
‘‘The Soviet Union as Proletarian Motherland, Korea as a Racial Mother-
land, and China as the Motherland of Liberation.’’ To Chu’s point of
view, such a strata was far better than Koreans being considered aliens in
China altogether, but hardly a tenable classification.34 In their attempts
to align Koreans with three different revolutions, Chu’s communist
colleagues were in fact replicating the old colonial problem of divided
loyalties, but draping the issue with proletarian garb. To his credit,
Chu’s emphatic support for unequivocal Chinese nationality for Koreans
in the Northeast would eventually place him squarely in the mainstream
of CCP policy. While working within this framework, however, Chu
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would receive aid from North Korea and embrace the possibility of North
Korean influence in Yanbian.
In August 1948, on the cusp of Shenyang’s liberation, Chu took the
long trip south from Harbin in order to liaise with the Shenyang Ethnic
Minorities Affairs Office. Here Chu was again charged with the responsi-
bility of stabilizing the Yanbian region. Somewhat surprisingly, his superiors
implied that many of the difficulties in the region actually stemmed
from wartime collaboration among Koreans in the region formerly known
as Jiandao. Chu was given this message in the form of a mandate of
‘‘suppressing any recurrence of Japanese imperialism.’’35 Paranoia about
backsliding into capitalism and pro-Americanism was indeed prevalent
among CCP leaders in 1948, and anti-Japanese movements that had
raged among students in Guomindang-controlled cities lent emphasis
to their recommendations. More locally, the fact that large numbers of
Japanese migrants (Ri qiao 日桥) remained in Manchuria, including in
Yanbian, and the lingering suspicion that a plurality of the Koreans was
functionally fluent in Japanese may have added to the otherwise odd
emphasis of the Shenyang leaders to Chu to prevent a Japanese revival in
his region. While anti-Japanese rhetoric had a prominent place in North
Korean rhetoric, rarely if ever did leaders in Pyongyang express anxiety
about a pro-Japanese revival north of the 38th parallel.36
In the autumn of 1949, Chu went to Beijing and subsequently
participated in festivities inaugurating the PRC. More importantly, Chu
took part in meetings on the minority question in the Chinese leader-
ship compound of Zhongnanhai, where he exchanged views with Zhu
De (朱德), Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), and other members of the Party elite.37
In Beijing, it is likely that Chu reunited with PRC Foreign Minister Zhou
Enlai, whom he had first met in Yan’an, forming a bond that would
last until, but not through, the Cultural Revolution. Chu To˘k-hae’s
appearance in Beijing in September 1949 also signals the importance
that the Central Committee of the CCP accorded to the Yanbian region.
Chu, after all, was merely in charge of a handful of big counties on the
eastern periphery of Jilin province and reported primarily to the adminis-
trative center of that province in Changchun and its chairman, Zhou
Baozhong. In addition to Chu To˘k-hae’s own connections (guanxi ), it
may have been due to Zhou Baozhong’s patronage that Chu was invited
to Beijing for the meetings. As a veteran head of Manchuria’s most legiti-
mated anti-Japanese movement in the 1930s and long-standing friend
of Kim Il Sung, Zhou Baozhong possessed an impressive range of
contacts in the North Korean Worker’s Party.38 But the meetings in
Beijing in preparation for the founding of the PRC were focused less on
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international friends than on forging a consensus among China’s various
minority groups. In Chu To˘k-hae’s case, the de facto Korean autonomous
region over which he presided was one of the earliest areas of CCP
control and, moreover, was a welcome conduit to China’s emerging
North Korean ally. However, few could have anticipated that that young
ally would lead China into a war during which the area under Chu’s
administration would be deeply tested.
After attending the ceremonies accompanying the declaration of
the People’s Republic in Beijing, Chu To˘k-hae returned on October
16, 1949, to a song-filled welcome at the Yanji train station by arts
troupes. Two female Yanbian University students adorned his path by
throwing flower petals. He gave a speech immediately upon arrival,
mounting a stage to state that ‘‘China’s revolution has shaken the entire
world (震动了整个世界) but is also the affair of 475 million Chinese people
who are themselves people of the world.’’ This emphasis on socialist inter-
nationalism was a shrewd means of aligning Yanbian residents not just
with the achievements of the Chinese revolution alone.39 In fact, Chu’s
remarks mirror those of North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ho˘nyo˘ng,
whose expression of excitement at the PRC’s victorious founding also
placed the CCP’s achievement in its global context.40
Whatever its intended emphasis, Chu’s soaring rhetoric could not
mask the difficulties of the task he was shouldering. Yanbian had been
left in a difficult condition by the Japanese, whose economic approach to
the region had emphasized paddy farming, not industrial development.
The Soviet occupation, and then the Chinese civil war, had further torn
the region away from a functional Korean economy and markets in Japan.
Economic ties to the provincial centers to its west, formerly the core of
what Steven Levine has called the ‘‘wealthy, urbanized Northeast,’’ were
shattered.41 Although Chu To˘k-hae had praised General Lin Biao and the
People’s Liberation Army for their ‘‘peaceful liberation of Changchun,’’
the long siege of the city comprising the administrative and economic
heart of Jilin province had been devastating to the Yanbian economy. It
is rather likely that in late 1948, an honest assessment from Chu would
have agreed with subsequent Chinese scholars of the Northeast who called
Changchun ‘‘a dead city’’ in that year.42 The sporadic revival of the
Changchun city economy began only in late 1948 and was hampered by
Northeast People’s Government Chairman Gao Gang’s (高岗) need to
direct exports to the U.S.S.R., making cross-border trade with North
Koreans all the more necessary for daily necessities in Yanbian. However,
large-scale economic exchange with the neighboring Korean province of
North Hamgyo˘ng was not possible, as that mountainous and arid region
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was marginalized even within the North Korean economy. (Yanbian’s
economically peripheral status contrasts markedly with the relatively
prosperous trade going on in the lower Yalu valley between Sinu˘iju and
its Chinese twin city of Andong.) The economy in 1949 in Yanbian was
therefore very poor. Paper factories existed in Kaishantun, and a coal
factory was still working in Tianbaoshan, but other than that, as Chu
recalled, the area was ‘‘blank as a sheet of paper.’’43
Blank paper may have been a fitting metaphor also for the area of
education. As in neighboring North Korea, materials for teachers were
lacking, salaries for educators were low, and compromises accordingly
had to be made. In such circumstances, past experience of Japanese modes
of education was not a significant barrier, while cross-border aid from
North Korea was eagerly welcomed. Chu recruited a team of experts
who were graduates of Japanese universities or, as in the case of
the cultivated Gao Yongyi (高永艺), universities in old Manchukuo.44
Gao was trained at the Xinjing Teacher’s College in Changchun (新京师
道大学, to which the obligatory prefix 伪 for ‘‘puppet’’ is now attached by
the PRC) and remains active today as a historian of the Korean minority.
Chu To˘k-hae’s chosen head of education, Liang Feng (梁凤), was also
a graduate of a Japanese university. Chu and Liang together succeeded
in setting up a high school in early 1950, with Cui Cai (崔蔡) as vice-
principal. After establishing the high school, ethnic Koreans finally had a
full complement of schools in which to enroll.45
But having satisfied the Koreans, Chu To˘k-hae was then set upon
with criticism from dissatisfied Han Chinese, showing the tension between
accommodation for ethnic Koreans and Han sensitivities. Han parents
and students complained of the lack of Chinese-language schools in the
area, further noting that existing Chinese schools were taught at a very
low level of linguistic proficiency. Chu To˘k-hae in response procured
money and books and opened a high school for Han students, importing
teachers who had graduated from schools in southern China. However,
these teachers quickly became dissatisfied with the conditions in Yanbian,
as the area was geographically isolated and living standards low. Cul-
turally, many of the new teachers bridled at being isolated among and
surrounded by Koreans in harsh winter conditions. Unable to raise
salaries, Chu To˘k-hae obtained more fish, meat, and more expansive grain
rations for the teachers, but having satisfied these Han teachers, Chu may
have again increased resentment among the Koreans, who wondered why
they were, as the local majority, eating less than the Han migrants.46 The
balancing act that Chu undertook with regard to various necessities
in peacetime indicates that ethnic tensions in Yanbian might well have
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been more problematic than Chinese and Korean propaganda would have
outsiders believe.
Because Yanbian shared a 230-kilometer border with the Soviet
Union and a 520-kilometer border with North Korea, Chu To˘k-hae often
had to deal with matters of international import. In spring 1950, fires
broke out near Hunchun along Yanbian’s border with the sparsely popu-
lated Soviet Far East, raising the question if Yanbian residents could cross
the border to fight the fires. In such instances, Chu necessarily sought the
counsel of the Foreign Ministry in Beijing.47 Chu returned to Yanbian
from Hunchun to find that fires had also broken out in the area around
Changbaishan, the huge and poorly demarcated mountain well known
to Koreans as Paektu-san and as the mythical origin of Tangun and the
Korean race.48 North Korean officials suggested that China was responsi-
ble for the fires, and Chu apologized, going the next day to the mountain
with Korean comrades. Taking a jeep over the Tumen River, they drove
upon a heavily wooded road that had been carved out of the pines
by Japanese militia in the service of anti-guerrilla suppression. Here Chu
To˘k-hae and his North Korean colleagues jointly decided that the old
trees in the area were in fact ‘‘the offices of Guomindang agents and
Syngman Rhee traitors.’’ That is to say, they decided to clear-cut the trees
in order to prevent the fire from spreading.49
While the North Koreans were occasionally difficult neighbors, in
other ways their new Democratic People’s Republic, far closer than
chaotic Beijing, was a proximate model for communists in Yanbian.
Fascination with Pyongyang was particularly evident at Yanbian Uni-
versity, an institution that emerged as a foremost conduit for cultural
exchanges with North Korea prior to 1950.50 From July 20 to August
10, 1949, Lin Minqiao (林民乔), one of Chu’s top aides, led a delega-
tion to Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang, an institution referred
to by Yanbian cadre variously as ‘‘Korea’s top university’’ and ‘‘Kim U.’’
(金大).51 Lin Minqiao’s return report explicitly stated that the North
Korean experience in university-building should be closely studied,
to the extent that even the slogans should be copied. Lin praised the
Pyongyang university as ‘‘a leading, comprehensive newly constructed
socialist university,’’ not forgetting to add: ‘‘Study from them, and study
from the Soviet Union.’’52 Twenty years later, Red Guard investigations
of Lin’s 1949 trip would conclude that his sojourn to Pyongyang resulted
in harmful ‘‘North Korean cultural influence entering Yanbian Univer-
sity.’’ To a certain extent, the charge was obvious: Yanbian University
thereafter imitated the organization of Kim Il Sung University by setting
up four science departments with twelve classes, and consequently it took
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four rather than three years to graduate. Guest professors were brought
from Pyongyang, and course offerings included ‘‘History of Struggle
of the Korean Ethnicity in the War of Liberation,’’ ‘‘Korean History,’’
‘‘History of Korean Literature,’’ and ‘‘Selections from Korean Docu-
ments.’’ Although their later accusations may have been groundless,
Chinese Red Guards asserted that students at Yanbian University in the
1950s sang ‘‘Song of General Kim Il Sung’’ and were said even to bow
to his portrait, as well as that of Chairman Mao, in the classroom.53 The
case of Yanbian University points to the problems of national identity and
dual nationalism that were ushered in by the postwar era, the division of
the Koreas, and the upswing of patriotism in the Korean War.
Trans-Border Population Flows
Academic exchanges with North Korea added tangibly to Yanbian’s
cultural capital, but not all cross-border exchanges were so formal or so
positive. Seeking opportunities outside of North Korea for reasons that
ranged from the political to the economic, Koreans illegally crossed the
Tumen River into Yanbian and moved into China proper. North Korean
immigrants who entered China through Yanbian often turned up in other
places and caused problems, making the region a troublesome gateway.
One report by an official in the distant Qingdao city administration,
Wang Shaoluo (王绍洛), dating from May 1950, explained the issue:
In investigating Qingdao after liberation, [we] often found North Korean sailors
and immigrants who had come to live in this city. One sailor and crew in
particular have been a problem for our People’s Government courts. Most
recently North Koreans have appeared freely coming in from the borders of
the Northeast and moving to Qingdao. The Korean immigrants rarely tally
with procedures: instead our government has to resolve their conflicts expressly
through disciplinary action.54
Wang located the source of his problem in the border cities of Andong
(Dandong) and Yanji, asserting that neither municipality was living
up to its responsibility to regulate the flow of Koreans into China.
‘‘Immigrants from all areas of the Northeast are staying in Andong, but
especially Korean immigrants, who are staying in the city for a long
time,’’ he noted. Wang continued his criticism of the Andong office for
not doing its job in preparing documents for those Koreans who go to
Qingdao, as those people needed but did not possess a proper citizen
certification ( ju min zheng 据民证). Highlighting the slippery nature of
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labeling Koreans with a nationality, immigration officers in Yanji were
criticized by Wang for promoting confusion between Korean nationality
and Korean ethnicity through indiscriminate use of the terms minzu/
minjok (民族) and Chaoxian/Chosun (朝鲜). Officials in Yanji, in other
words, had a nuanced view of which terms applied under what con-
ditions, but from the Qingdao perspective, all of the Koreans arriving
in China should have been categorized immediately as Korean nationals
and appropriately restricted. Wang’s frustrated missive to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs found a final target of wrongdoing in Tumen, the small
city abutting the Tumen River and the border with North Korea at the
eastern edge of Yanbian.
Wang gave several examples of law-breaking Koreans in his munici-
pality. One North Korean migrant from near Tumen, Wang wrote,
‘‘came to Qingdao by stealth (潜行来青), reclaiming and then selling
used clothing and engaging in other illegal activities.’’ As if this unsanc-
tioned commercial activity were not vexing enough, Wang concluded his
memorandum with a complaint couched within a rhetorical question:
‘‘Doesn’t it seem that immigrants from Northeastern counties are failing
to follow our procedures for foreigners moving around the country’’ (东北
县侨民是否应按外侨手续旅行)?’’55 Small capitalists were spilling out of
Korea, through Yanbian, and into China, replicating the troubling trends
of the 1930s. Moreover, the alleged laxness of Yanbian border officials
toward their North Korean counterparts indicated the limits of toleration.
North Korean refugees were also committing crimes in northeastern
provinces closer to the border. The Bureau of Foreign Affairs (Waishiju) of
the Shenyang Police Department, on July 13, 1950, reported on a twenty-
four-year-old North Korean who, under the guise of studying at an un-
named local university, had committed crimes in the city. Another North
Korean national also in his twenties was moving between Harbin and
Dalian to commit crimes; on July 25, 1950, he was apprehended. Harbin
was rife with foreigners who required surveillance, and Korean nationals
often were caught up in the net. The potential association of Koreans
with criminal elements among the Japanese population in cities like
Changchun was also noted by CCP investigators. Case files and court
decisions (刑事判决) on Koreans in China indicate that not just young
Koreans were prosecuted throughout 1950; men and women ranging
from their thirties to their fifties also figured into court decisions. Border
cities like Tonghua, with majority populations of ethnic Koreans, were
hotspots for court cases for renegades.56 Two of the crimes described
above occurred in the days after the Korean War broke out in June
1950, indicating that whatever the propaganda line of North Korean
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friendship being intoned in Beijing, for local police in Northeast China,
North Koreans who moved among their Chinese counterparts potentially
represented a locus for trouble. Insofar as Yanji was the gateway for much
of this activity, the problem merits further investigation, as does Chu
To˘k-hae’s attitude toward immigration from North Korea. Although
Koreans had largely been able to shed the stigma of association with
Manchukuo, and further aided the CCP in recovery of the Northeast
and the campaigns for Hainan island, doubts still remained about issues
of belonging and loyalty. These would be most deeply tested in the
singular event of the early PRC, the Korean War.
The Korean War in Yanbian
China’s intervention in the Korean War elicited powerful manifestations
of nationalism in Northeast China which coincided with the emergence
of the PRC as a state.57 Chinese Koreans in the Yanbian region were far
from immune to these trends and indeed were among the most ardent
supporters of the communist war effort in vast Northeast China after
June 25, 1950. However, the war—which began as a Korean civil
war—raised at least three difficult questions for the Chinese Koreans.
The first related to the upswing in anti–South Korea propaganda: CCP
media consistently indicated that there were two separate types of Koreans
encompassing ‘‘good’’ communists and ‘‘traitorous puppets’’ who yet
adhered to proto-fascist ideologies in South Korea.58 When anti-rightist
movements broke out in Yanbian and nationwide in 1951, it became clear
that traitorous Koreans, from the CCP point of view, did not reside in
South Korea alone. The second difficult question raised by the war came
along with North Korean victories in June–September 1950. These battle-
field successes south of the 38th parallel and the incipient unification of
Korea elicited conflicting impulses among Chinese Koreans—on the one
hand, they were proud of North Korean victories, even possessive about
them, but on the other hand, as China prepared for war, Chinese Koreans
had to reaffirm that Yanbian was wholly Chinese and that they were fore-
most good citizens of the PRC and loyal to Chairman Mao. The third dif-
ficult question in 1950 related to the possibility of the North Korean state
simply evaporating and the very tangible problem of North Korean refugees
trickling and then flowing into Yanbian. All of these factors added to the
pressures on Yanbian’s Korean residents to declare overtly and often their
wholehearted allegiance to the People’s Republic of China foremost.
On June 30, 1950, pro–North Korean themes were prevalent in the
Adam Cathcart Nationalism and Ethnic Identity in the Sino-Korean Border Region 41
city of Yanji. An estimated ten thousand participants gathered, not so
much to protest American action in Taiwan, but to celebrate the libera-
tion of Seoul by the Korean People’s Army. While most of China had
only received news of the war on June 28, 1950, and were tentative
in organizing street activities, Yanji city had rapidly organized a rally.59
The Yanji organizers evidenced little of the confusion voiced by Foreign
Ministry bureaucrats in Beijing who, having been snubbed by Kim Il
Sung in terms of forewarning of his invasion, were reluctant to combine
celebrations of North Korean success with ‘‘opposing the U.S. invasion
mobilization activities of Taiwan’’.60 In Yanbian, the progress of the Korean
People’s Army would be highlighted at every turn, and pro–North Korean
propaganda in the Northeast was thereafter quite prevalent in the Yanbian
news media from July to September, 1950. While Beijing’s Xinhua News
Agency remained the source of most of the information published in
Yanbian’s major Korean-language newspaper, Dongbei Chaoxian Renmin
Ribao (Northeast Korean People’s Daily), items originating from North
Korea tended to be placed more prominently in Yanbian than in Beijing
papers, while local reports (e.g., 本报报告 benbao baogao) tended also to
focus on ties to the North. Statements by North Korean Foreign Minister
Pak Ho˘nyo˘ng were frequently printed in Yanbian newspapers, articles
that denounced American aggression and stoked confidence among
Yanbian Koreans of the justice of the North Korean cause. Glorification
of Kim Il Sung and the Korean People’s Army, another sometime theme
of the mainland press, was pushed with more frequency in the Yanbian
press. Korean victories over the United States were voiced as proof of the
tide of revolution sweeping over Asia, a validation of China’s influence.
This wave of pro–North Korean internationalism, however, brought
difficult questions of national allegiance to the fore in Yanbian, necessitat-
ing deep, strong, and consistent messages of centralization from, and
loyalty toward, Beijing. Implemented most prominently by Chu To˘k-
hae, such rhetoric strengthened as the war turned toward the Chinese
frontier. Chu To˘k-hae made clear his role in promoting ‘‘motherland
education’’ and emphasizing the need to liberate Taiwan as well as South
Korea in a speech he made (in Korean) supporting the resolution to
oppose U.S. action.61 Residents of the border zone linked themselves
thereby to the nationwide movement and the need to propagandize
against U.S. action. However, the media for the war were so abundant
that exceptions inevitably slipped through. Cartoons by Beijing artist
Xiao Ding (小订) about ‘‘Protecting World Peace’’ evoked the ‘‘mother-
land’s independence’’ alongside the ‘‘heroic North Korean People’s Army,’’
rendering unclear which nation was the ‘‘motherland.’’62 Newspaper editors
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in Yanbian thereafter felt it necessary to devote a corner of each day’s
front page to images of ethnic Koreans praising their ‘‘Chinese mother-
land.’’ What is interesting about this hardly subtle pushing of motherland
themes in education and propaganda materials is the extent to which they
reopened the very question of multiple national loyalties that the CCP
and Chu To˘k-hae had supposedly settled two years prior in Shenyang.
At the same time, proximity to North Korea led to an ease of mass
action. Close connection with North Korea made mobilization at Yanbian
University in defense of North Korea more immediate—and even more
ardent—than at politically aflame campuses like Beijing University, where
protection of the sacred Northeast was more of a rallying cry than defend-
ing an abstract North Korea.63 Model soldiers also played an important
role in recruiting students in Yanbian. Recruiting accelerated in Yanbian
when, on November 7, 1950, posters and large front-page articles appeared
urging men to sign up to fight the Americans. Ethnic Korean model
soldiers of Chinese nationality were singled out and accordingly praised.64
On December 15, 1950, the recruiting drive for participation in the
armed struggle in Korea had already succeeded in having 1,500 youths
sign up in Yanbian. From 1950 to 1953, nearly 5,000 Yanbian youths
signed up to join the Chinese People’s Volunteers, while 5,740 signed up
to go to Korea as technicians, laborers, and translators. Of these students,
an estimated 6,981 were killed or considered missing in action.65 How-
ever, some students with high linguistic aptitude were not permitted to
go to the front and stayed behind at Yanbian University or at high schools
set up by Chu To˘k-hae to develop skills in Russian, which would further
cooperation with China’s socialist allies.66
While military recruiting efforts were expanding as fall changed to
winter in 1950, the Yanbian University library was contemplating its
very survival. Anticipating American bombing and the physical destruc-
tion of the Yanji city center (and therefore the university), Chu To˘k-hae
and the local government ordered the library’s holdings to be moved out-
side of Yanji proper. Thus, in imitation of the trip to the ‘‘Great Rear’’
of the great northern universities to the southwest during the War of
Resistance, the university’s library holdings were moved some forty
kilometers southwest to a village outside of Helong, where they were
kept in a large family compound that had recently been confiscated from
a major landlord. The books were finally returned to Yanji city after the
front in Korea stabilized, but the concern with assuring their survival in
the event of American air raids indicated the university’s unique frontline
position. One could volunteer not simply to ‘‘protect homes’’ (baojia)
in China, but also to protect one’s library holdings from the foreign
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imperialists.67 Yanbian University’s frontline position with ties to North
Korea was further seen on September 23, 1950, when vice-chancellor
Lin Minqiao led a delegation to North Korea. His entourage was pictured
on the front page of the region’s major newspaper, indicating support for
his continued mission of strengthening institutional and educational ties
in Pyongyang.68
Yanbian’s distinctive position in Sino–North Korean relations was
frequently made clear in such images of national and regional leaders,
but cadre working in Yanbian’s newspapers had to take pains to balance
their depictions. Chinese leaders, however distant, simply could not be
outshined by the local, charismatic, and Korean-fluent leaders like Lin
Minqiao and Chu To˘k-hae. One way of balancing this issue was to have
Mao frequently channeled via Chu To˘k-hae: in other words, Chu To˘k-
hae’s appearances in the press began invariably to mention Chairman
Mao, as when Chu was pictured writing a note to Mao Zedong in prepa-
ration for celebrating National Day, October 1, 1950, in Yanbian. Chu’s
letter to Mao was breathlessly described as full of news from local city
organizations about the propaganda activities they had undertaken to
integrate Yanbian with ‘‘the motherland’’ of China.69 Publications of
Mao’s photograph were set alongside a nation-building motif: the design
and seal for the People’s Republic of China. While these graphics had
been widely publicized at their inception in the autumn of 1949, their
appearance as front-page material in Yanbian papers in September 1950
reads as a reminder to the Koreans that their foremost pride was to be
directed toward the emerging model capital at Beijing, not embattled
Pyongyang.70 Whenever front-page news and photographs appeared
about North Koreans visiting in Yanji, Mao’s approving attitude toward
the development was necessarily discussed.71 Yet there were exceptions
to Mao’s appearances in the media. Essays by North Korean officials
were occasionally published in Yanbian, sometimes with their flattering
photos. Northeast People’s Government head Gao Gang was likewise a
respected Chinese presence in Yanbian and Northeastern media during
the Korean War. On September 6, 1950, Gao Gang’s work was the
subject of an article that filled up the entire breadth of the front page (at
least that portion not taken up by his handsome photograph).72
The mainland Chinese press made liberal use of Kim Il Sung’s image
and name during the war, but these images took on particular significance
in Yanbian. On July 16, 1950, the Yanbian newspapers printed photos
taken inside a North Korean home, where mothers and children stare up
at a portrait of the North Korean leader.73 (The appearance of this rather
worshipful photo, however, might be explained as counterbalancing the
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speech on the same page by Kim’s eventual rival, Foreign Minister Pak
Ho˘nyo˘ng.)74 On September 14, 1950, in a supplement titled Renmin
Huakan, a large photo showed young North Korean female cadets in
front of a Kim Il Sung statue, showing that Yanbian news editors coun-
tenanced at least a bit of Kim’s rising personality cult, certainly more than
existed in the People’s Daily.75
In terms of worshipful press treatment, however, no individuals or
organizations were more lauded than the Chinese People’s Volunteers
(CPV). When the CPV and the remnants of the Korean People’s Army
pushed south down the peninsula after November 1950, victories were
celebrated in Yanbian. On January 9, 1951, the Yanji city ‘‘Resist America,
Aid Korea’’ committee convened a massive rally in the city’s center, filling
the local assembly ground with tens of thousands of participants and
spectators. As it tends to be in Manchuria in January, the weather was
very cold, and the Yanji crowd was well bundled. Banners had been
made proclaiming, among other things, ‘‘Celebrate the Liberation of
Seoul.’’ With the CPV in the forefront, the achievements of the North
Korean army were also celebrated. The ceremony, in distinction to those
going on in distant Chinese provinces like Sichuan at the time, included
a large number of North Korean flags.76 There were also North Korean
refugees and orphans in the crowd. Musicians banged cymbals in spite
of the cold.77
Conclusion
The rally for the second liberation of Seoul foretold the coming stages
of Yanbian’s long Korean War. The campaign to repress counter-
revolutionaries, implemented in 1951, and the subsequent ‘‘Three-Anti
and Five-Anti’’ movements would strike Yanbian with particularly his-
torical force. Uncovering ‘‘enemy agents’’ from within meant hearkening
back to and recapitulating detailed debates from the colonial days and
the Minsaengdan struggle of the early 1930s. Chu To˘k-hae would attack
bandits—alleged spies air-dropped in from South Korea—and demand
vigilance of Yanbian residents. Thus the actions in Yanbian during the
Korean War sealed China’s physical border with North Korea, but did
not prevent future Red Guard superpatriots in Yanbian from attacking
‘‘revisionism’’ across the border and struggling against Chu To˘k-hae for
his alleged sellout to North Korean interests in the earliest years of the
PRC.
While the Chinese Koreans were adamant in their support for the
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PRC, they were also supporters of North Korea and risked being seen as
perhaps more loyal to the DPRK than to the CCP. That tensions existed
(as seen with the Han schools) further suggests that Koreans were not
very well assimilated, but rather existed in a much more separate reality
than their sometime integration with Han populations (and the Central
People’s Governments in Shenyang and Beijing) might imply. Still, it
seems loyalty to the CCP overrode ethnic tensions. The alternate loyalties
and dual nationalism espoused by Chinese Koreans in the years after
liberation from Japan made excellent conduits for Sino–North Korean
exchange, cooperation, and dialogue.
Chu To˘k-hae was at the forefront of this process of exchange with
the DPRK, and his activities during the Korean War should become
clearer with future research. In particular, Chu’s agency in being awarded
stewardship of the new Korean Autonomous Region of Yanbian estab-
lished by the central government in 1952 needs to be examined with
reference to the Korean War. Why 1952? Was the establishment of the
administrative structure in Yanbian a vote of confidence from Beijing
in Chu To˘k-hae’s ability to contribute to central directives or a move to
further collar independent initiatives from, and establish greater control
over, Chinese Koreans in Yanbian? In the late 1950s, the Chinese Koreans
came to be seen as somewhat of a ‘‘model minority,’’ a status attested to
by Beijing’s facilitation of Tibetan delegations to Yanbian in that period
to observe how a faithful and nominally autonomous ethnic region should
be run.78
Chu To˘k-hae’s rule was tested from 1951 to 1953 with the emer-
gence of the ‘‘Three-Anti, Five-Anti’’ movements. During the Korean
War, the paranoia that swept the mainland also arrived with special
emphasis in Yanbian, where Chinese Koreans who had collaborated with
Japan were particularly targeted. Although themes of collaboration had
been muted since the violence of the Chinese civil-war years, it became
clear in Yanbian newspapers and in massive public struggle meetings that
the ghosts of Manchukuo had not been entirely expiated. The stigmas
faced by Chinese Koreans for having collaborated with the past Japanese
occupiers were seen again as a threat that invited dangerous foreign
influence into the Chinese northeast. Moving away from such rhetoric,
and assuring the central government that South Korean spies were not
moving freely among the Chinese Korean population in Yanbian, became
a difficult task for the ethnic Korean leadership in Yanji.
With the end of the Korean War, Chinese Koreans were able to
resume some semblance of normalcy, taking upon themselves the hard
work of assimilation with, and construction of the Chinese mother-
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land. The more than ten thousand North Korean refugees who had
streamed into Yanbian and Northeast China during the war slowly made
their way back to the DPRK, where hundreds of thousands of Chinese
troops were stationed until 1958. Premier Zhou Enlai subsequently
honored the work of Chu To˘k-hae with a visit to Yanbian in 1962, and
up through the mid-1960s, by all appearances, it seemed that Chinese
Koreans had managed to hurdle the issue of nationality by simply becom-
ing Chinese patriots. In the cauldron of the Cultural Revolution,
however, the fac¸ade of Han tolerance for ethnic harmony and Korean
majorities in Yanbian would come violently askew.79 Red Guards from
Beijing, later guided by envoys from Mao Zedong himself, would arrive
in Yanbian to persecute Chu To˘k-hae as a hanjian (traitor) and to demonize
all the aspects of Korean identity that had made Yanbian a model auton-
omous region, from language instruction to loyal cooperation with North
Korea. Chu To˘k-hae, unable to be rescued by distant friends in Beijing,
lay dying in 1971, the victim of Red Guard attacks. From his perspective
at this moment of supreme turbulence, the civil-war era debates of
assimilation and the work for communist revolution among Chinese
Koreans in Yanbian in the early years of the PRC must have appeared
halcyon indeed.
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